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1. Motivation 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) boomed in India after previous restrictions were progressively 
relaxed throughout the 1990s. FDI was widely expected “to work wonders” in India, quoting the 
former Minister of Finance, P. Chidambaram (Indian Express, November 11, 2005). However, FDI 
appears to be clustered within the country and so the benefits might accrue to a limited number of 
states and districts (Purfield 2006). To the extent that new foreign investors locate where their peers 
located before them, it would become increasingly difficult for regional policymakers to attract FDI 
to relatively remote locations and overcome the legacy of having been sidelined at earlier stages of 
India’s opening up. 
 
Previous empirical evidence on peer effects on location choices of foreign investors is surprisingly 
scarce. Moreover, most existing studies refer to large regional units such as US states or Chinese 
provinces, and often neglect more complex spatial effects such as surrounding market potential and 
distance-weighted clustering.
1 We contribute to closing these gaps by drawing on case-specific data 
on the location choices of foreign investors and non-resident Indians (NRIs) at the level of 542 
Indian districts.
2 The location choices of 6,020 new investors in 2001-2003 represent our binary 
dependent variable, while the previous choices of peers are reflected in accumulated counts since 
1991. 
 
2. Analytical background and hypotheses 
Investors decide on a particular location based on expected profitability. Thus, their choices depend 
on how the characteristics of a given location and its spatial environment affect profits, relative to 
                                                           
1 Recent examples include Bobonis and Shatz (2007) on US states, Cheng and Kwan (2000) on Chinese provinces, 
Crozet et al. (2004) on French departments, and Ledyaeva (2009) on Russian regions. 
2 The data on FDI approvals was kindly made available by the Department of Industrial Promotion and Policy of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Note that NRIs are regarded as a distinct source of FDI in the database.  
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the characteristics of other locations. Local characteristics relate to the business environment, 
economic geography and institutional conditions. Specifically, existing clusters may attract 
subsequent FDI by allowing for knowledge spillovers as well as offering larger regional markets 
and a wider range of intermediate inputs. Such factors will induce investor i to choose location j if 
profit πij >πik, for all possible locations k ;  ij ij ij U ε π + = , with  ij U  representing the deterministic 
part and   ij ε  the error term. The probability of choosing location j is: 
Pij =
exp(Uij)
exp(Uik)
k=1
n
∑
       ( 1 )  
In our conditional logit model (CML), the dependent variable takes the value of one if investor i 
chooses location j, and zero otherwise.  ij U  in equation (1) is assumed to be a linear combination of 
the explanatory variables: 
m
ij m ij ij ij X X X U β β β + + + = ........
2
2
1
1         ( 2 )  
Of these, two explanatory variables account for peer effects, i.e., previous location choices:  
FS j = Count j +
Countm
d j−m j∈s
∑   and FAj = Count j +
Countm
d j−m j∈s
∑      (3) 
j FS refers to all previous investors from the same country of origin as investor i, while  j FA refers to 
all previous foreign investors from elsewhere. Both count variables consider investors who chose 
location j (here, a particular district in India) or neighbouring locations (weighted by their distance 
from j) prior to investor i. By separating FS and FA, we can assess whether “herding” is particularly 
strong among investors from the same country of origin.
3 
 
                                                           
3 The separation between FS and FA limits our choice of model. The choices of investors need to be matched on a one-
to-one basis with those belonging to the same country of origin. This matching is not possible in models such as Poisson 
wherein the dependent variable is a count. The major limitation of the CLM is that the ratio of probabilities for 
alternatives j and k does not depend on any alternatives other than j and k (i.e. the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives).  
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Apart from herding, we consider various characteristics of a particular location that can affect the 
profit of the investor. Larger local markets, proxied by population, are expected to attract FDI. 
Accessibility of surrounding markets within a radius of 500 km (MA) relates to the population of 
neighbouring locations, discounted with rising distance from location j. FDI may also be attracted to 
locations with greater economic diversity offering specialized inputs. We use the Herfindahl index 
calculated as the sum of squared employment shares of all industries in location j, with higher 
values reflecting less diversity. Cost-oriented FDI is theorized to locate where (non-agricultural) 
hourly wages are relatively low. On the other hand, FDI may draw on better-qualified labour, which 
we capture by higher-secondary education at the district level. The quality of local (physical) 
infrastructure is reflected by several indicators, including the availability of electricity, telephones, 
transportation (buses), and financial services (banks). Finally, we account for institutional 
conditions such as the flexibility of labour market regulations at the level of Indian states and social 
unrest at the district level (riots).
4 
  
 
3. Results 
The empirical results from our CLM are summarized in Table 1, and are presented in the form of 
odds ratios. A ratio greater (smaller) than one implies a positive (negative) effect of the regressor on 
the probability of investor i choosing location j. The estimation in column (1) is based on the overall 
sample of all location choices by foreign and NRI investors during the years 2001-2003.
5 The 
explanatory variables are all significant, mostly at the one percent level. An increase in local market 
size (population) by one percent improves the odds of attracting an investor by about 16 percent. 
Accessibility of surrounding markets (MA) impairs the odds, however, negating the view that rural 
                                                           
4 The data for the explanatory variables relate to 2001. See Appendix 1 for the definition of all variables and sources 
used. Appendix 2 provides summary statistics 
5 We report only the full specification of the CLM, including all determinants mentioned above. We performed several 
robustness tests with a restricted set of determinants. In particular we reduced the number of indicators on physical 
infrastructure in order to mitigate possible multicollinearity. The results (available on request) proved to be robust to 
these changes.  
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districts that are closer to large metro areas tend to receive more FDI. Rather, metro areas seem to 
divert FDI away from rural districts with limited market potential, thereby widening the urban-rural 
divide in India. Higher values of the Herfindahl index reduce the odds of attracting an investor, in 
line with the expected positive impact of greater industrial diversity.  
 
All indicators of physical infrastructure have a positive impact. The same applies to the educational 
attainment of the local workforce, whereas higher local wages are associated with an odds ratio 
considerably below one. The latter finding clearly suggests that cost-oriented FDI plays a major role 
in India. Institutional conditions also matter as expected, with flexible labour market regulations 
improving, and local social unrest (riots) impairing the chances to attract FDI. 
 
Turning to peer effects, both FA and FS enter with an odds ratio significantly above one. It may be 
surprising that the effect of a one percent increase in the count of previous investors from the same 
country of origin raises the odds of attracting a new investor by just six percent, compared to 71 
percent with regard to investors from other sources. Nevertheless, the impact of increasing the 
absolute count by one is typically stronger for FS than for FA. This applies especially when the 
number of peers from the same country of origin is very small compared to peers from all other 
countries. The odds ratios reported in column (1) would imply a stronger impact of one additional 
FS count for countries or origin that account for less than eight percent of the total FDI counts.
6 
 
In the next step, we assess whether the general pattern shown in column (1) of Table 1 holds for 
sub-groups of investors from major countries of origin. In columns (2) – (5), we report the odds 
ratios for investors from the United States (28.1 percent of all FDI cases in 2001-2003), the United 
                                                           
6 The general pattern revealed in column (1) does not preclude that the same result holds for larger countries of origin in 
country-specific estimations; see also below.  
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Kingdom (8.5 percent), Germany (7.1 percent), and Japan (5.3 percent).
7 Column (6) provides the 
odds ratios for FDI by NRIs (4.3 percent), who may behave differently because of closer contacts 
and better knowledge of local conditions.  
 
Similarities across sub-groups of investors exist with regard to the impact of population and wages. 
Yet, the local market orientation of German investors appears to be particularly strong. By contrast, 
US and UK investors are particularly cost-oriented, as reflected in odds ratios substantially below 
one for the wage variable. NRIs resemble German investors in that the impact of local markets is 
particularly strong, while the impact of labour cost is relatively weak. The accessibility of 
surrounding markets does not attract FDI from any source, corroborating the general pattern 
mentioned above.
8  
 
The impact of physical infrastructure on FDI from particular sources is more ambiguous than the 
general pattern in column (1). Specific indicators are often insignificant at conventional levels, and 
sub-groups of investors appear to focus on different aspects of infrastructure. The evidence is 
strongest for financial services (banks). Likewise, institutional conditions matter for almost all sub-
groups of investors, though with striking differences. Flexible labour market regulations at the state 
level encourage only US investors in a significant way.
9 By contrast, NRIs are discouraged most 
strongly by social unrest at the district level, possibly because they have a better knowledge of local 
enforcement of law and order.  
 
                                                           
7 In contrast to all other estimations, the results for Japan are quite sensitive to changes in the specification (e.g. when 
dropping specific indicators of infrastructure). Hence, we do not consider the estimation in column (5) for the 
subsequent discussion. 
8 In sharp contrast to the general pattern, the odds ratios of the Herfindahl index are significantly larger than one for FDI 
by US investors and NRIs, indicating that they are attracted to districts with higher concentrations of industrial activity 
(rather than diversity). However, these odds ratios are not robust to changes in the specification of the estimation 
equation. 
9 US investors are also peculiar insofar as they prefer districts with a better educated labour force.  
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Most strikingly, peer effects vary considerably across sub-groups of investors. The odds ratios of FS 
and FA are almost the same for US investors. This implies that herding is particularly strong among 
US investors when considering the impact of one additional count of FS and, respectively, FA. UK 
investors appear to behave in line with the general pattern, even though FS fails to pass 
conventional significance levels. The surprising finding that German investors avoid locations 
where national peers invested earlier may be related to the particularly strong local market 
orientation noted above.
10 Accordingly, already established peers may be regarded as competitors 
having occupied profitable markets, rather than frontrunners showing the way and reducing FDI-
related risk for followers.  
 
Finally, column (6) in Table 1 suggests that peer effects do not drive FDI by NRIs. This finding 
would be plausible: NRIs might be more familiar with local conditions than foreign investors so 
that they could afford to make more autonomous decisions about location. However, the odds ratios 
of FS typically turn out to be significantly above one in (unreported) specifications with specific 
indicators of infrastructure excluded. Hence, it does appear that NRIs ignore previous location 
choices by foreigners (similar to German investors), while relying to some extent on previous 
location choices by their fellow NRIs (in sharp contrast to German investors).  
 
4. Summary 
This paper makes an important contribution to the understanding of peer effects and locational 
determinants driving foreign investment decisions. Using new FDI data in India we find that 
investors are often attracted to districts that their national or other peers previously favoured. This 
would imply that with regard to FDI, geography might increasingly become destiny in the course of 
time. Public policy might be hard pressed to change the location decisions of investors at the 
margin.  
                                                           
10 Similarly, Crozet et al. (2004) find that German FDI in France does not agglomerate but is rather dispersed.  
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Table 1: Conditional logit model results - Odds ratios 
  All  USA  UK  Germany  Japan  NRIs 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Population  1.1581*** 1.4144*** 1.1368  2.3185*** 1.0974  1.6170** 
  [0.028] [0.093] [0.149] [0.372] [0.300] [0.359] 
FA  1.7121*** 1.2967*** 1.6508*** 0.9416  1.3206  0.7552 
  [0.038] [0.093] [0.252] [0.104] [0.300] [0.225] 
FS  1.0563*** 1.2580*** 1.0665  0.8291*** 1.1543  1.1273 
  [0.009] [0.072] [0.124] [0.047] [0.123] [0.174] 
Herfindahl  0.9077*  1.9240***  0.8021 0.8307 0.5710 2.6562* 
  [0.049] [0.390] [0.245] [0.133] [0.232] [1.516] 
MA  0.8320***  0.8153 0.7564 0.7725**  0.6662 0.8804 
  [0.040] [0.105] [0.150] [0.100] [0.290] [0.630] 
Electricity  1.4067*** 0.4563*** 1.2088  0.9622  7.0052*  1.5101 
  [0.099] [0.112] [0.506] [0.264] [7.862] [2.970] 
Telephones  1.0919**  1.9462*** 1.1938  1.4977*** 0.6643  2.9057** 
  [0.040] [0.219] [0.169] [0.206] [0.280] [1.407] 
Education  1.1383***  1.8460***  0.9735 0.9151 0.9904 1.2223 
  [0.038] [0.181] [0.156] [0.106] [0.423] [0.678] 
Buses  1.2981*** 3.7268*** 1.0280  0.9682  0.3796**  2.6153** 
  [0.052] [0.513] [0.256] [0.171] [0.143] [1.181] 
Banks  1.5261*** 1.9405*** 1.2394  1.5160*** 1.1759  2.5405** 
  [0.047] [0.134] [0.251] [0.182] [0.274] [0.939] 
Wages  0.6828*** 0.2520*** 0.4291**  0.8269*  0.4729  0.7165* 
  [0.034] [0.052] [0.159] [0.091] [0.326] [0.137] 
Labour regulations  1.4006***  1.6521***  1.1592 1.0234 1.0644 1.7481 
  [0.090] [0.279] [0.386] [0.268] [0.677] [1.043] 
Riots  0.8166*** 0.2026*** 0.9291  0.6620**  2.4370  0.0710*** 
  [0.037] [0.047] [0.154] [0.106] [1.350] [0.059] 
Observations  261,743  24,255  3,236 6,027 2,342 1,730 
AIC  18143.55  3652.14 787.84 1406.66 722.07  679.28 
BIC  18279.73  3757.39 866.90 1493.82 796.93  750.21 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 1: Explanatory variables – Description and sources 
   Variable  Definition  Source 
           
Herfindahl 
Herfindahl index; smaller index 
values reveal greater economic 
diversity 
55
th Round NSSO 
MA 
Market access; population in 
surrounding district, weighted by 
distance from district j 
2001 Census/ orthodromic distance  
Economic 
geography 
Population  Total population of district j 2001  Census 
Wages  Non-agricultural hourly wage rates   55
th Round NSSO 
Electricity  Proportion of villages with access 
to electricity  55
th Round NSSO 
Telephones  Proportion of villages with access 
to telephone connections  55
th Round NSSO 
Education  Proportion of population with 
higher-secondary education  55
th Round NSSO 
Buses  Proportion of villages with bus 
services  2001 Census 
Business 
environment/ 
Infrastructure 
Banks  Banking branches per 1 lakh 
population  CMIE  
Labour 
regulations 
Flexibility of labour market 
regulations at the state level  Besley and Burgess (2004) 
Institutional 
variables  Riots  Number of riots per capita 
Marshall and Marshall 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr
/inscr.htm  
FA  Previous FDI (all countries of 
origin, excluding FS)  Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Previous FDI 
FS  Previous FDI (same country of 
origin)  Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Notes: 1 Lakh = 100,000 
NSSO: National Sample Survey Organisation; CMIE: Centre for Monitoring of the Indian Economy 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Expected 
sign  #  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Investment decisions
*     542  38  167  0  1289 
Herfindahl -  533  0.2995  0.2085  0  1 
MA +  530  322,228  624,025  534  7,397,880 
Population +  533  2,514,384  1,925,607  0  12,300,000 
Wages -  454  102.11  59.43  18.67  525.39 
Electricity +  454  0.6879  0.2299  0  0.9977 
Telephones +  454  0.1341  0.1056  0  0.6212 
Education +  454  0.0752  0.0443  0  0.2368 
Buses +  533  0.6535  0.6531  0  1 
Banks +  415  8.14  3.81  1.99  26.09 
Labour regulations  +  490  0.3534  0.4780  0  1 
Riots -  427  0.00009  0.00011  0  0.00102 
FA +  542  84  199  0  1394 
FS +  542  2  11  0  314 
*Reference years: 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
Note: # refers to the number of districts for which there are observations. 
 